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INTRODUCTION
Policy, scholarly, and popular discussions of the socially desirable
level of protection provided by intellectual property rights typically
take for granted that changes in the level of intellectual property protection matter a great deal. It is commonly assumed to make a substantial difference in regulating access to intellectual goods whether
patent claims are broadly or narrowly interpreted, the copyright term
is longer or shorter, or the fair use exemption is applied more or less
generously. This assumption follows what appears to be an uncontroversial proposition commonly set forth in intellectual property jurisprudence and scholarship: patents, copyrights, and other entitlements determine which technologies and creative works fall into the
private domain (to which access is constrained) and which remain in
1
the public domain (to which access is unfettered). In this Article, I
show that this proposition should be controversial. It is not clear that
changes—even substantial changes—in intellectual property protection typically make any meaningful difference in regulating access to
the underlying pool of intellectual goods, which in turn means that
these changes do not clearly make any meaningful difference in regulating the anticipated profits that drive innovation incentives. Contrary to natural intuitions, the size of the public domain may be sub-

1

For indicative statements from case law, see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309 (1980), which quotes Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948), for the proposition that abstract ideas are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none,” and International News Service v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), claiming that “[t]he general
rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained,
conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the
air to common use.” For indicative statements from the scholarly literature, see Yochai
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 358 (1999), which states that “property rights in information mean that the government has prohibited certain uses or communications
of information to all people but one, the owner. The public domain, conversely, is the
range of uses privileged to all.” See also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY
L.J. 965, 968 (1990) (defining the public domain as “a commons that includes those
aspects of copyrighted works which copyright does not protect”).
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stantially invariant to changes in intellectual property coverage. This
qualified indifference thesis is founded in a well-established empirical
observation: firms generally can—and do—exploit devices other than
intellectual property to limit access to, and thereby appropriate re3
turns from, innovation investments. Hence, intellectual goods that
are unprotected by intellectual property may still be protected directly
or indirectly by other legal or extralegal mechanisms, which broadly
include technology, contract, organizational form, and various complementary assets.
If these alternative instruments can substantially replace the appropriation capacities provided by intellectual property rights, then
legal changes that constrain those rights and thereby ostensibly expand the public domain have no substantial net effect; conversely, if
these alternative instruments can match or exceed the appropriation
capacities provided by intellectual property rights, then legal changes
that expand these rights and thereby ostensibly narrow the public
domain have no substantial net effect. This proposition is selfevidently true in the extreme case where perfect technological locks
can be implemented at zero cost: contractions or expansions in intellectual property coverage have no marginal effect on the access costs
incurred by third parties and, as a consequence, on the innovation
gains anticipated by resource holders. In a broader class of intermediate settings, this proposition retains descriptive force to the extent
that firms can exploit alternative instruments substantially to reproduce, or even surpass, the appropriation capacities provided by intellectual property.
If there is reason to doubt that nontrivial changes in intellectual
property coverage always yield nontrivial effects on access to intellectual goods, then there must be reason to doubt the incentives/access
tradeoff that is the familiar foundation for normative discussions
4
about the desirable scope of intellectual property. This tradeoff assumes that more intellectual property generates social harm by reducing access to intellectual goods, but generates social benefits by enhancing anticipated profits and thereby enhancing innovation
incentives. Conversely, less intellectual property generates social
2

There are a variety of definitions of the public domain in the scholarly literature.
In this Article, I use it in the broadest practical sense, as referring to technologies and
creative works that are freely accessible by third parties without the holder’s consent,
whether as a matter of law, technology, or otherwise.
3
See infra Section I.B.
4
See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
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benefits by expanding access to intellectual goods but generates social
harm by reducing anticipated profits and thereby reducing innovation
incentives. Hence, the policy challenge lies in setting intellectual
property coverage so as always to yield a net social gain.
But the zero-sum tradeoff that drives this policy calculus does not
hold universally, or even typically, as soon as we drop or relax the unstated but critical assumption that firms cannot use substantially costequivalent exclusionary devices. Without that assumption, the incentives/access tradeoff is no longer a safe bet. There can be no assurance that (i) nontrivial contractions in entitlement strength will nontrivially reduce the costs of accessing intellectual goods and thereby
decrease innovators’ anticipated rewards and investment incentives,
or (ii) nontrivial expansions in entitlement strength will nontrivially
increase the costs of accessing intellectual goods and thereby increase
innovators’ anticipated rewards and investment incentives. Any reduction in intellectual property coverage will have trivial effects if it
simply induces firms to migrate to the next-least-costly alternative instrument by which to maintain reasonably equivalent appropriation
capacities; and any expansion of intellectual property coverage will
have trivial effects if firms already make use of alternative instruments
that deliver equivalent or greater appropriation capacities at a comparable or lower cost.
This line of argument immediately raises a conundrum: if neither
more nor less IP exerts a substantial effect on access costs and innovation gains over some meaningful range of circumstances, then why do
profit-maximizing firms expend resources on influencing changes in
5
intellectual property coverage? Working out this conundrum yields a
nuanced thesis that identifies more precisely the circumstances under
which changes in intellectual property coverage do and do not matter.
Even in a world of substantially cost-equivalent appropriation instruments, intellectual property coverage still makes a difference so long
as we make the reasonable assumption that alternative instruments—
or more precisely, the relative costs of using those instruments—are
not equally distributed among all existing and potential participants
6
in the relevant market. Where that assumption is satisfied, any
change in entitlement strength does have nontrivial effects.
Contrary to conventional assumptions, these are not effects on the
total gains available as a result of the appropriation capacities pro5
6

See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
See infra subsection II.B.1.
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vided by legal instruments, but on the distribution of those gains
among firms that exploit the appropriation capacities provided by a
portfolio of legal and extralegal instruments. Even if more or less intellectual property makes no difference on the margin so long as the
market generally can use substitute instruments to cover shortfalls in
intellectual property coverage, it makes considerable difference on
the margin if each individual firm incurs nonidentical costs in migrating to those substitute instruments. If alternative instruments are not
available at reasonably comparable cost to all actual and potential participants in the relevant market, then relaxations of intellectual property coverage will shift gains to firms that have the lowest-cost access to
alternative instruments and away from firms that have the highest-cost
access. Hence, even if intellectual property has trivial effects as an incentive instrument with respect to the market as a whole, every individual firm rationally invests resources in influencing intellectual
property coverage. Everything else being equal, reducing coverage
will shift rents away from firms with higher-cost appropriation technologies (which should lobby for “critical” intellectual property) while
increasing coverage will shift economic rents away from firms with
lower-cost appropriation technologies (which should lobby against
“excessive” intellectual property).
If we recognize the typical availability of substantially costequivalent alternative instruments, then intellectual property is trivial
with respect to the total rents generated by innovation investment. If
we recognize that alternative instruments are typically distributed unequally across firm types, then intellectual property is nontrivial with
respect to the distribution of rents in the relevant market. Surprisingly, the typical abundance of alternative instruments among incumbents and the typical paucity of such instruments among entrants imply that the distributive effects of relaxing intellectual property may
often be “regressive” and the distributive effects of increasing intellec7
tual property may often be “progressive.” Commentators usually assume that distributive effects run in precisely the contrary direction:
stronger intellectual property coverage presumably increases the entry
costs incurred by small-firm entrants and therefore increases the pricing power exercised by large-firm incumbents, which in turn punishes
8
end-users. But if intellectual property typically has a differential,
nontrivial impact on smaller firms that have the highest-cost access to

7
8

See infra Section II.B.
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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alternative instruments, then the relationship may be reversed.
Weaker legal protections exacerbate large firms’ inherent appropriation-cost advantage over small firms, which in turn implies that incumbents’ market share is more securely protected under less, not
more, intellectual property coverage, which in turn enhances pricing
power and punishes end-users. Conversely, stronger intellectual
property protections mitigate large firms’ inherent cost advantage in
appropriating innovation rents, which in turn implies that large firms’
market share is less securely protected under more, not less, intellectual property coverage, which in turn constrains pricing power and
benefits end-users. Contrary to the typical view that “strong IP” favors
entrenched large firms while “weak IP” favors small-firm entrants,
weak IP will often protect incumbents against entrants while strong IP
will often protect entrants against incumbents.
To summarize, intellectual property typically has trivial incentive
effects but nontrivial (and often progressive) distributive effects. But
do these “progressive” distributive effects matter from a social point of
view? Venture capitalists and garage inventors are not the standard
candidates for distributive equity. Curiously, a refined understanding
of intellectual property as a distributive instrument may breathe new
life into the familiar, but empirically challenged, rationale for intellectual property as an incentive instrument. If we understand intellectual property as primarily a distributive instrument that shifts rents
away from incumbents characterized by high levels of integration and
toward entrants or other entities characterized by low levels of integration, then intellectual property may matter as an incentive instrument
that operates primarily and indirectly at the “macro” level of industrial
organization. In particular, if intellectual property supports the economic viability of stand-alone, transactional structures that exhibit
weak appropriation capacities, it may facilitate certain kinds of innovation investment to which such structures are commonly thought to be
well-suited, even if it has little effect on the total volume of innovative
investment. While further inquiry is certainly required, it can be conservatively stated that there is limited but meaningful evidence (and
widespread belief in the business world) that small firms and variants
thereof (in the business vernacular, start-ups, spin-offs, and the like)
exhibit unique innovative competencies in some industries at certain
9
stages of the innovation life cycle. Assuming that this view is more
systematically demonstrated, then the conventional thesis that IP mat9

See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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ters as an incentive device may turn out to retain a significant scope of
application, but for an unconventional reason: namely, because intellectual property induces innovative output by firms that would otherwise be disadvantaged by the inherent cost-advantage of large firms in
capturing innovation returns through instruments other than intellectual property. Following this hypothesis, the distributive and incentive
effects of intellectual property would nicely coincide: intellectual
property makes the greatest difference in correcting distributional
inequalities in appropriation costs in the same markets where it makes
the greatest difference in eliciting innovative output from small-firm
entrants and other weakly integrated entities.
The discussion proceeds as follows: in Part I, I review the incentives/access tradeoff and the related assumptions that lie behind it,
describe empirical evidence that challenges those assumptions, and
then reformulate the limited conditions under which intellectual
property coverage will matter as an incentive instrument; in Part II, I
identify the broader conditions under which intellectual property will
matter as a distributive instrument for allocating innovation rents across
firm types; finally, in Part III, I explore how the distributive function of
intellectual property may indirectly yield incentive effects by supporting innovation investment by small firms and other weakly integrated
entities.
I. WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS AND IS NOT TRIVIAL
In this Part, I begin by drawing out the assumptions behind the
conventional view that intellectual property is always nontrivial, which
in turn supports the view that the incentives/access tradeoff always
governs the choice between stronger or weaker levels of intellectual
property protection. Second, I review empirical evidence that challenges these assumptions. Third, I identify a generic set of circumstances in which intellectual property does and does not matter as an
incentive instrument, taking into account firms’ capacities to shield innovation rents through mechanisms other than intellectual property.
A. Why Intellectual Property Is Nontrivial (Always)
Conventional discussions of intellectual property rest on a few
common and interrelated propositions, which are usually left unstated
in discussions that are otherwise dependent on these propositions being true in all or most cases. These assumptions are detailed below.
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Conventional Proposition I : Less intellectual property increases
the size of the public domain; more intellectual property decreases it.
This proposition would seem to follow self-evidently from the fact
that intellectual property increases the cost of using otherwise freely
accessible intellectual resources. This in turn motivates widespread
opposition to enclosure of the public domain by stronger forms of intellectual property and widespread advocacy for weaker forms of intel10
lectual property to “free the commons.” Considered more closely,
however, this proposition necessarily assumes that no other instruments exist by which holders of intellectual resources can implement
substantially equivalent access restrictions at some substantially equivalent cost. Hence, it is more precise to say that increasing or decreasing the strength of intellectual property decreases or increases the size
of the public domain, respectively, assuming the unavailability of
other instruments by which resource holders can restrict access to
substantially the same extent at substantially the same cost. Where
that assumption is not satisfied, the market simply fills any appropriability deficit caused by the contraction of any state-provided property
entitlement, and, conversely, the state simply mimics any marketprovided appropriation capacities when it expands any intellectual
property entitlement.
This is true (self-evidently) in the extreme case where technological locks on intellectual resources perfectly constrain access at zero
cost: whether the state reduces or adds intellectual property protections would have no incremental impact on the size of the public domain, which holds constant. Even in intermediate scenarios where alternative instruments imperfectly restrict access at some positive
incremental cost, this observation retains considerable force: expansions or reductions in intellectual property coverage will have a limited incremental effect on the size of the public domain to the extent

10

This literature is extensive. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW
BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Benkler, supra note 1; James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 33. For an indicative contribution from the advocacy literature, see NANCY KRANICH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, INFORMATION COMMONS
(2004). For a review of this literature, see Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property
Grab: Protect Innovation, Not Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365 (2007).
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that firms can exploit alternative instruments to achieve a similar level
of coverage at some reasonably equivalent cost.
Conventional Proposition II : Less intellectual property decreases
innovation gains; more intellectual property increases innovation gains.
Conventional Proposition II follows self-evidently from Conventional Proposition I. If intellectual property matters because it constrains access to the public domain, then it must also matter because
expanding the resource holder’s exclusive territory increases the gains
that it can expect to derive from a successful innovation, which obviously increases its innovation incentives. Hence, all else being equal,
innovation incentives are stronger in a world with more complete intellectual property coverage relative to a world with less complete coverage. Like Conventional Proposition I, Conventional Proposition II
necessarily assumes that no other instruments exist by which resource
holders can implement substantially equivalent access restrictions at
some substantially equivalent cost. Hence, it is more precise to say
that increasing or decreasing the strength of intellectual property increases or decreases innovation incentives, respectively, assuming the
unavailability of other instruments by which resource holders can restrict access to substantially the same extent at substantially the same
cost. Again, that is self-evidently true in the extreme case where technological locks perfectly restrain access: abolishing, or introducing
even the strongest forms of, intellectual property makes no difference
if innovators can exploit substitute technologies at zero incremental
cost. This proposition holds true in intermediate settings to the extent that resource holders can use some combination of alternative
instruments to regulate access and thereby appropriate returns from
innovation investments at some reasonably equivalent cost.
Conventional Proposition III : Intellectual property always poses
a zero-sum tradeoff between incentive gains and access costs.
Taken together, Conventional Proposition I plus Conventional
Proposition II yields Conventional Proposition III. Virtually all students learn, many academic commentaries repeat, and countless judicial opinions state that stronger or weaker intellectual property always
involves an unavoidable tradeoff between increasing innovation incentives (and resulting innovation gains), which result from stronger
intellectual property, and reducing access costs, which result from
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11

weaker intellectual property. This is equivalent to stating simply that
entitlement strength correlates positively with innovation gains and
access costs; the policymaker’s challenge then is setting intellectual
property strength such that innovation gains always exceed access
costs. Strictly speaking, the access costs generated by intellectual
property protections are confined to deadweight losses incurred
whenever a buyer is willing to pay the marginal cost of an intellectual
good but not the supracompetitive premium rationally demanded by
12
its legally exclusive holder. However, even an economically driven
intellectual property regime would recognize that where a buyer is
willing to pay the supracompetitive premium, distributive losses are
incurred in the form of consumer surplus transferred from buyer to
producer. These efficiency and distributive effects together drive the
basic incentives/access tradeoff: marginal increases in intellectual
property are socially desirable to the extent that marginal incentive
gains exceed the associated bundle of marginal social costs; conversely, marginal decreases in intellectual property are socially desirable to the extent that marginal reductions in the associated bundle of
social losses exceed marginal incentive losses. However, if neither
Conventional Proposition I nor Conventional Proposition II holds,

11

The tradeoff is almost as old as the intellectual property system itself. As cited
by the Supreme Court, Thomas Jefferson stated, “‘[T]he things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent,’ . . . must outweigh the restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1966). For contemporary examples, see ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 13-15 (4th ed. 2006), which states that intellectual property solves the public-goods problem by providing exclusivity to artists
and inventors but at the social cost of limited access and diffusion of new works and
ideas, and WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 22-24 (2003), which argues that intellectual property
should be designed to balance the benefits and costs in the incentives/access tradeoff.
12
An important category of deadweight losses is also generated where efficient
transactions are frustrated by legal, negotiation, and other administrative costs attendant to an intellectual property regime. This is a common theme of the expanding
literature on “anticommons” effects, whereby proliferating intellectual property rights
creates a “thicket” that impedes subsequent innovation. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 621 (1998) (stating that excessively fragmented property rights can generate
net social losses by impeding, rather than facilitating, investment); Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (reiterating Heller’s thesis from The Tragedy of the Anticommons with respect to gene patents). For a more nuanced treatment that takes into
account the market’s potential ability to correct patent thickets, see Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
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then the incentive gains and the access costs attributable to even substantial changes in intellectual property coverage may often be nominal (or, as I show below, perverse), in which case the zero-sum incentives/access tradeoff is not a reliable framework for assessing
proposed changes in intellectual property coverage.
B. Market Alternatives to Intellectual Property
The conventional proposition that IP matters and the various assumptions that stand behind it rest on a single (and usually unstated)
empirical predicate: namely, that firms have no or limited access to
cost-equivalent substitutes for intellectual property by which to regulate access to intellectual resources. Intellectual property must matter
because it blemishes a pristine commons of intellectual goods free
from restrictions on access. To the extent that the above predicate is
not satisfied, each of these assumptions loses considerable force or
scope of application, which in turn challenges the basic proposition
that intellectual property generally makes a difference in regulating
access costs and incentive gains. If firms can migrate to equivalent exclusionary instruments at no or little positive incremental cost, then
providing more or less intellectual property will make no difference in
regulating access (contra Conventional Proposition I), which means
that it will make no difference in regulating incentives (contra Conventional Proposition II), which means that it does not involve any meaningful (or at least any “directionally uniform”) tradeoff between innovation gains and access costs (contra Conventional Proposition III).
As discussed immediately below, a well-developed body of empirical evidence suggests that this required predicate is usually not substantially satisfied over a wide range of markets and industries, where
firms typically use a combination of instruments other than intellectual property to substantially contain knowledge spillovers. Most strikingly, economically significant markets exist in which firms exhibit little reliance on intellectual property in order to appropriate returns
from innovation investment but do rely on a host of other legal and
13
extralegal instruments to regulate access. Consider the worldwide
market in financial and other data, which operates with great success
virtually bereft of intellectual property but uses technology to limit ac13

For a detailed taxonomy of such markets, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Sharing in the
Shadow of Property: Rational Cooperation in Innovation Markets 30-38 (Univ. of S. Cal. Sch.
of Law, Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C08-22, 2008) [hereinafter Barnett, Sharing], available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1287283.
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14

cess. Hence, contrary to conventional intuitions, the pristine commons of an unregulated pool of intellectual resources may be a theoretical artifact that is rarely realized in practice. And that means that
policymakers rarely face a choice between intellectual property or no
restrictions at all; rather, the real choice is between intellectual property and some mix of substitute instruments to which resource holders
will necessarily make recourse in order to capture innovation returns.
Evidence for this claim is found most directly in multiple survey
studies that use questionnaires (sent to managers of medium to large
manufacturing firms) to assess the relative importance of patents as a
device for appropriating revenues relative to all other available in15
struments. The results are remarkably consistent across time and industry: outside of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, managers consistently rank patents among the least effective appropriation
instruments and rarely respond affirmatively when asked if patent pro16
tection is a “but for” condition for undertaking a research project.
14

To be precise, U.S. law provides virtually no protection for the factual content of
database products, while the European Union provides certain sui generis protections for
database products. Compare Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 36264 (1991) (holding that a phone directory could not be the subject of copyright protection because it was not sufficiently original), with Parliament & Council Directive 96/9,
On the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20, 20 (EC) (noting that “databases are at present not sufficiently protected” and acting to cure this deficiency).
15
See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 790-91 (surveying R&D
managers in publicly traded firms in the United States with substantial R&D expenses);
Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174
(1986) (surveying R&D managers of one hundred randomly chosen U.S. firms from
twelve industries); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 4 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (surveying R&D managers randomly
drawn from a sample of all R&D labs in the United States operating as part of a manufacturing firm). For a similar earlier survey using a smaller data set of forty-four U.K.
firms, see C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 81-83 (1973).
16
See TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 15, at 194-99 (finding that in twenty-four
out of thirty companies in the sample set, managers believed that R&D investment was
not or was minimally dependent on expected patent protection, and noting that companies that relied on patent protection were in the pharmaceuticals and chemicals sectors); Mansfield, supra note 15 (finding that firm managers in all industries other than
chemicals and pharmaceuticals believed that, absent patent protection, inventions during that period would have decreased not even thirty percent); see also Levin et al., supra note 15, at 798 (finding that managers, outside chemicals and pharmaceuticals,
often view patents as ineffective mechanisms to protect against imitation, and that
managers use alternative devices to do so); Cohen et al., supra note 15, at 9 (finding
that most industries, other than chemicals and pharmaceuticals, viewed patents as the
least effective mechanism for appropriating returns from innovation).
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The studies were conducted from the 1970s through the early 2000s,
and, hence, presumptively rebut any meaningful correlation with contemporaneous changes in the perceived level of patent protection (in
particular, the persistence of these results through the latest study rebuts any expectation that firms would attribute greater value to patents as a result of the Federal Circuit’s increased enforcement of patents starting in the early 1980s). The apparent lack of correlation
between managers’ subjective ranking of the importance of patent
protection and the legal strength of patent protection conforms nicely
with other studies that have sought to identify, in various contexts,
correlations between levels of R&D investment and changes in the le17
gal strength of patent protection. Remarkably, no determinate relationship can be identified: that is, the aggregate investments made by
firms in R&D (as distinguished from firms’ investments in patent
prosecution and enforcement) do not appear to be affected—or
stated most conservatively, do not seem to be systematically affected—
by upward or downward adjustments in the effective strength of patent protection.
The aforementioned studies principally provide a ranking order
of intellectual property relative to other appropriation instruments,
where intellectual property tends to fall toward the bottom of the
scale, and measure the sensitivity of innovative output to intellectual
property coverage, which tends to be low. Business-management
scholars have developed a large empirical literature that supplies an
important complementary knowledge base by providing extensive detail on the diverse inventory of substitute devices by which firms can
substantially regulate access. These alternative instruments can be

17

Multiple studies have reached this type of result. See, e.g., Josh Lerner, The Economics of Technology and Innovation: 150 Years of Patent Protection, 92 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 221, 222-23 (2002) (examining 177 policy changes in patent protection across 60 countries over a 150-year period and finding that changes have little
effect on patenting rates by domestic entities but a meaningful effect on patenting by
foreign entities); Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What Is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting? 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 6204, 1997), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6204
(finding that patenting rates have risen but measures of R&D intensity showed no significant change in recent years). For a fuller review of the evidence on whether patents provide incentives to invest in innovation, see generally James Bessen & Michael J.
Meurer, Do Patents Perform Like Property?, ACAD. MGMT. PERSPS., Aug. 2008, at 8.
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usefully organized into four general categories, discussed briefly in
18
turn below.
1. Technology
The most obvious alternative to intellectual property is technology, which is used widely by resource holders to limit unauthorized
access, especially to tacit knowledge without which it is often difficult
to replicate a successful product. Technologies for regulating access
can be understood broadly to include secrecy precautions that constrain leakage of valuable information, formal and informal nondisclosure practices that govern research and development, and any
product configuration or manufacturing process that increases third
parties’ replication costs. These can be surprisingly effective and longlasting (consider the Coca-Cola formula): contrary to the conventional framework where imitators perfectly copy an original technology at virtually no cost, empirical inquiries tend to find that competi19
tors often incur substantial costs in replicating an existing product.
In other industries, firms successfully use technology to condition access by end-users to what is otherwise a legally unprotected intellectual
good: consider Bloomberg, the leader in the worldwide market for financial data (as noted above, largely unprotected under copyright
20
law ), which requires that users purchase product-specific “Bloomberg
terminals” in order to use the firm’s database. Or, closer to home for
a legal audience, consider the Westlaw or LexisNexis services for U.S.
case law: while the immediate product is unprotected under copy21
right law, the providers limit usage through technological measures
18

For a more detailed review of relevant evidence, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257-69 (2004) [hereinafter Barnett, Private Protection].
19
See Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91
ECON. J. 907, 909-10 (1981) (U.K.) (finding, based on interviews with firm managers in
several industries, that imitation costs average about sixty-five percent of the cost incurred in innovation and that imitation time averages about seventy percent of the
time required to develop the original product). Note that Mansfield defines imitation
costs and time broadly to include both product development and all subsequent
“bringing to market” costs. Id. at 909.
20
See supra note 14.
21
This observation is supported, in increasing scope of application, by case law, see
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834) (refusing to allow copyright protection for Supreme Court opinions), statute, see 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (precluding
copyright protection for federal governmental works), and Copyright Office policy, see
COMPENDIUM II: COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 305.08(d) (1984)
(disallowing copyright protection for federal or state government documents).
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that effectively constrain access subject to a pricing schedule. And as
is well known in the software, online-entertainment, and consumerelectronics sectors, firms make wide use of encryption, copyprotection, and a variety of other “digital rights management” (DRM)
technologies that can finely regulate user access based on pricing
22
plans and various other criteria.
2. Contract
Firms widely use contractual instruments to impose limitations on
the use of their products. Various examples can be cited. In the software industry, vendors attach “shrinkwrap” and “clickwrap” agreements to software purchased at retail or online venues, respectively,
and bind the purchaser to terms that may exceed the rights to which
the vendor is entitled under copyright or patent law. Every reader has
almost certainly engaged in such a transaction. Suppose you
download a copy of the standard version of Adobe Acrobat, the popular application for reading and producing PDF files. You will immediately become subject to the eleven-page Adobe Software License
Agreement (available in thirty-two languages) that imposes a variety of
obligations—including, among other things, covenants not to reverse
engineer “or otherwise attempt to discover the source code” of the
software and, subject to certain exceptions, not to transfer the software or authorize the software to be copied to another individual’s
23
computer. Through this contractual instrument, Adobe constructs a
customized and detailed intellectual property regime enforceable
against the end-user irrespective of any rights to which Adobe may be
entitled under intellectual property law.
This example illustrates a basic point: even if copyright or patent
protection were abolished, firms could still bind point-of-sale consumers and other directly transacting parties through contractual restric22

DRM covers a broad range of technologies that regulate, track, and meter access to digital and online content—including text, audio, video, and photographic images—using encryption, encoding, digital watermarking, user authentication, and
other techniques. For an overview of these technologies, see LAWRENCE HARTE, INTRODUCTION TO DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (DRM) (2006). For a critical review
with special reference to the anticopying technologies that protect DVDs, see TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE ch. 6
(2007), and with reference to music, see PATRICK BURKART & TOM MCCOURT, DIGITAL
MUSIC WARS: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 102-11 (2006).
23
ADOBE Software License Agreement cls. 4.3 & 4.5, available at http://
www.adobe.com/products/eulas/pdfs/Gen_WWCombined-20080205_1329.pdf (last
visited April 15, 2009).
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tions. While the enforceability of these contracts is sometimes contested, the law seems fairly settled in most jurisdictions that these contracts are relatively immune to challenge so long as certain notice and
other procedural requirements to satisfy judicial concerns over ag24
gressive “fine print” tactics are met. In sophisticated licensing transactions involving patented technologies or copyrighted works, rights
holders typically include a variety of provisions that (among other
things) limit the usage of the licensed technologies to geographically,
commercially, or technologically defined “fields of use” or provide for
“grant back” rights that require the licensee to share with the licensor
any improvements that the licensee makes to the technology. In the
context of corporate research and product development, firms constrain the outflow of tacit and other human-embodied knowledge
through contractual provisions that punish employees economically
for departing a firm—most notably, through noncompete provisions
(admittedly of dubious enforceability in some jurisdictions) or forcedresale provisions (and other provisions of similarly punitive effect) in
employee stock-option agreements. In all these contexts, contract
provides an important instrument by which resource holders limit access, both by identified third parties with whom they enter into fully
negotiated business relationships and unidentified third parties with
whom they transact anonymously in the retail context.
3. Organization
Firms can select among a wide variety of structures to organize the
research-and-development, production, marketing, and distribution
functions that comprise any innovation process. Broadly speaking,
these structures can be situated along a spectrum ranging from complete integration—where all functions are performed in-house—to
zero integration—where a disembodied firm contractually outsources
all functions. Each of these structural choices provides firms with different appropriation capacities. In general, increased integration improves a firm’s ability to contain spillovers, where integration is understood to include both (i) vertical integration down the supply chain
24

For a well-known decision that strongly upholds end-user licenses, see ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996). For a more measured decision
that advances a standard by which online contracts are enforceable provided that certain context-specific procedural requirements are satisfied, see Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Note that the ProCD decision also rejects (and notes other circuits that reject) challenges to end-user licenses
based on “preemption” arguments under copyright law. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453-54.
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from production through distribution, and (ii) horizontal integration
25
across a portfolio of related products and services. Hollywood film
studios have historically followed a horizontal-integration strategy,
which internalizes spillovers from successful releases by investing resources in the production of a wide variety of collateral merchandise
and other derivative applications in a series of sequels and other adap26
tations. Pharmaceutical firms have historically followed a vertical integration strategy, which internalizes spillovers by undertaking research, testing, production, and marketing through in-house
functions, thereby limiting any inadvertent outflows of proprietary
27
knowledge. Intermediate options between full and zero integration
include a wide variety of joint ventures, partnerships, and strategic alliances, where firms integrate some functions while using contractual
instruments and equity investments to implement other functions
through arm’s length or long-term cooperative relationships with
other firms. These hybrid arrangements are typical in the biopharmaceutical industry, which relies on contract- and equity-based partnerships between “upstream” suppliers of biotechnology innovations
and “downstream” providers of capital-intensive production, market28
ing, and distribution capacities. Through these varied organizational
structures, participating firms can finely regulate voluntary knowledge
“between-flows” among coventurers while limiting involuntary knowledge “outflows” to nonparticipants.

25

Note that I am using “horizontal integration” in a manner that departs somewhat from standard usage, where it usually refers to a firm’s acquisition of its direct
competitors. The phenomenon described in the text above could alternatively be
called a diversified or conglomerate form of organization.
26
On the diversified, conglomerate structure that tends to characterize firms that
dominate the film and related media markets, see RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 314, 318-24 (2000), which observes
that dominant media firms tend to operate diversified operations across cable, TV,
publishing, and film markets—identifying Time Warner, Disney, News Corporation,
and Viacom as examples—and attributes this diversified structure to an attempt to capture synergies through multiple applications of the same set of creative inputs within a
single firm given the high costs of using arm’s length contracts to achieve the same result.
27
See Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987, 1016-17 (2000)
[hereinafter Barnett, Genetic Commons].
28
See id. at 1015-21; see also David B. Audretsch, The Role of Small Firms in U.S. Biotechnology Clusters, 17 SMALL BUS. ECON. 3 (2001); Gary P. Pisano, Using Equity Participation To Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 109
(1989); Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Strategic Alliances: An Empirical
Analysis of Biotechnology Collaborations (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 6014, 1997).
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4. Complementary Assets
Business history is littered with the remains of firms with brilliant
ideas that never achieved substantial market penetration. It is well established in the business-management literature that the commercial
success of a new technology is critically dependent on a firm’s ability
to bundle its technology with complementary assets that facilitate se29
curing market share against actual and potential competitors.
Broadly speaking, these assets encompass (i) economies of scope in
the form of complementary goods and services offered to the target
consumer (including service and support functions), (ii) economies
of scale in the form of marketing, production, and distribution effi30
ciencies, and (iii) firm goodwill. Properly speaking, complementary
assets form part of the total products-and-services bundle that any
competitor must replicate in order to deliver a reasonable economic
substitute that can threaten the incumbent’s market position. Hence,
any competitor in the consumer-goods industry will face a powerful
obstacle simply by virtue of the fact that the leaders have access to an
existing set of complementary assets in the form of goodwill, worldwide distribution and marketing networks, production infrastructure,
and contractual and other relationships, all of which take years to accumulate and are not amenable to rapid imitation.
Complementary assets are a powerful tool that can substantially
raise third parties’ entry costs; hence, even in industries where the
underlying technology enjoys little to no robust protection from intellectual property, these inherent cost barriers mean that established
firms can reasonably expect to have the capacity to defend innovation
rents against smaller-firm entrants. And conversely, smaller-firm entrants cannot reasonably expect to have substantial capacity to achieve
the same outcome, which in turn reduces competitive threats and increases incumbents’ pricing power even in the absence of any formal
instrument by which to frustrate entry. Empirical studies that examine some or all of these factors provide ample support for this view,

29

For the leading source, see David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation:
Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285,
288 (1986), which explains, “In almost all cases, the successful commercialization of an
innovation requires that the know-how in question be utilized in conjunction with
other capabilities or assets.”
30
This list commonly includes tacit knowledge, which I have incorporated under
the technology category discussed above.
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showing that established incumbents historically exert a strong “first
31
mover” advantage over subsequent entry threats.
C. Why Intellectual Property Is Trivial (Sometimes)
Intuitively, we conceive of intellectual property as a legal instrument that uniquely imposes access restrictions on intellectual goods
32
that are otherwise open to public use. But it is more precise to say
that intellectual property sets a per-unit price for coverage against unauthorized usage, which in turn regulates the rate of substitution by
firms between intellectual property and all other available mechanisms by which to regulate access to intellectual goods. This reformulated framework is grounded in the rich body of empirical evidence
showing that intellectual property rarely acts as a firm’s unique source
33
for imposing access restrictions on intellectual goods. Intellectual
property is therefore only one member of any firm’s portfolio of appropriation instruments, each of which can be construed as offering
“units of coverage” against unauthorized usage of intellectual goods at
34
a certain, constant per-unit cost. Each firm must then elect whether to
expend resources on adopting and enforcing formally available intellectual property rights or implementing some combination of alternative instruments to secure innovation returns. This is a variant on the

31

For a review of the literature, see William T. Robinson et al., First-Mover Advantages from Pioneering New Markets: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 9 REV. IND. ORG. 1
(1994) (Neth.). For further reviews of the literature that reach a similar view and provide independent research reaching similar results in selected markets, see Mary
Lambkin, Order of Entry and Performance in New Markets, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL
ISSUE) 127, 127 (1988), which states that “[i]t is widely believed, both by academics
and management practitioners, that early entrants into newly developing markets enjoy an enduring competitive advantage over later entrants,” and providing independent research further confirming this view, and Gary L. Lilien & Eunsang Yoon, The
Timing of Competitive Market Entry: An Exploratory Study of New Industrial Products, 36
MGMT. SCI. 568, 569 (1990), which describes research showing that pioneering entrants generally maintain their market-share advantage and that pioneer entry is one of
the major determinants of the long-term success of a new product. I note that some
commentators contest whether the first-mover advantage is sometimes overstated, and
that others even identify a second-mover advantage whereby pioneering firms’ innovations are imitated by latecomers or existing incumbents. For various illustrations of
this thesis, see STEVEN P. SCHNAARS, MANAGING IMITATION STRATEGIES (1994).
32
See supra note 1.
33
See supra subsections I.B.1-4.
34
Note that I assume throughout that (i) while the costs of coverage differ across
instruments, the units of coverage are homogenous, and (ii) there are no complementarities between appropriation instruments. It would be interesting to relax one or
both of these assumptions in a more extended analysis.
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economizing problem that commonly drives the transaction-cost35
economics literature, where the firm selects governance structures so
as to limit the costs of third-party opportunism; in this construct, the
firm allocates resources within its appropriation portfolio so as to
maximize coverage against (and thereby limit the costs of) third-party
expropriation of its intellectual resources.
Suppose that a firm has a fixed “appropriation budget” of resources dedicated to shielding innovation returns against third-party
36
expropriation. When legal changes reduce the strength of an intellectual property entitlement, the per-unit cost of obtaining coverage
through intellectual property effectively rises, which induces the firm
to shift resources toward the next-least-costly alternative instrument in
its portfolio so as to sustain its existing coverage to the maximum extent possible. When legal changes increase the strength of an intellectual property entitlement, the per-unit cost of coverage through intellectual property effectively falls, which induces the firm to shift
resources away from the next-least-costly instrument in its portfolio so
as to maximize coverage. To illustrate this idea more concretely, suppose that a new legal standard makes it harder to defend the nonobviousness of a patent claim (as illustrated by the Supreme Court’s
37
2007 decision in KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. ): everything else being equal, firms will rationally divert resources from adoption and enforcement of patents to alternative appropriation devices. Alternatively, suppose that a new legal standard makes it easier to defend the
validity of a patent claim over nontechnical subject matter (as illustrated by the Federal Circuit’s 1998 decision in State Street Bank &
35

For the seminal reference, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF
GOVERNANCE (1996).
36
This fixed-budget assumption is a simplification for expositional purposes,
equivalent to supposing a firm that expends all of its resources on appropriation activities and cannot access external capital. This assumption would be relaxed in a more
extended analysis that explicitly models the firm’s consumption choice as a function of
the elasticity of the firm’s demand for coverage against unauthorized usage with respect to changes in the cost of obtaining coverage through available appropriation instruments. Note that, generally speaking, it can be expected that relaxing the fixedbudget assumption would make the indifference thesis (“IP does not matter”) more
robust with respect to downward adjustments in intellectual property (since firms
could expand the appropriation budget to fully replicate withdrawn state-provided appropriation capacities), which is the focus of this Article’s analysis, but less robust with
respect to upward adjustments in intellectual property (since firms could expand the
appropriation budget to exploit additional state-provided appropriation capacities).
In subsequent discussion, I show that certain applications of the indifference result
hold even where this assumption is relaxed. See infra subsection I.C.4.
37
550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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38

Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. ): everything else being
equal, firms will rationally divert resources from alternative mechanisms to patents. So long as we assume a fixed appropriation budget
and reasonably cost-equivalent alternative instruments, it logically follows that any firm’s appropriation capacities are substantially invariant
to the level of intellectual property protection.
Contrary to conventional expectations, IP does not always matter;
rather, it is always an empirical question subject to the difference in
per-unit cost of coverage between the relevant intellectual property
entitlement and the next-least-costly combination of substitute instruments. This analysis will focus on the case where the state relaxes
or even abolishes intellectual property protections over the relevant
39
set of intellectual resources. The market will not “sit still” in response to the withdrawal of intellectual property coverage. Firms will
rationally divert the resources previously used to adopt and enforce
the lapsed entitlement to the next-least-costly alternative instrument,
thereby preventing some to almost all of the underlying intellectual
resources from reverting to the public domain. Empirical evidence as
described above—technology, contract, organization, and complementary assets—provides a firm basis for believing that the stock of alternative instruments is rich and therefore the value of any cost differ40
ence often may be nominal. That is, there typically exist effective
alternatives to cover substantially any reduction in intellectual property protection so that resource holders simply respond to downward
adjustments in intellectual property coverage by diverting resources to
alternative instruments. If so, then each of the Conventional Propositions is, at best, nominally true in a meaningful range of circumstances: that is, any firm’s ability to control access, and therefore its
anticipated incentive gains, is largely invariant to the effective level of
intellectual property coverage, given that a firm approximately main-

38

149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
The remainder of the discussion will continue to focus primarily on downward
adjustments in intellectual property coverage, in part for reasons of space and in part
because that is the proposed policy change under debate at the moment. As suggested
by the general articulation of the discussion so far, I believe that the analysis would
substantially apply with some modification to upward adjustments in intellectual property coverage. The basic intuition is simple. The same circumstances where downward
adjustments of intellectual property make no difference are the same circumstances
where upward adjustments of intellectual property make no difference: alternative
instruments replicate the appropriation outcomes that firms would rationally secure by
law at the same or higher cost.
40
See supra subsections I.B.1-4.
39
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tains its appropriation capacities by shifting resources within its appropriation portfolio.
A simple hypothetical will suffice to illustrate how this thesis complicates the incentives/access tradeoff that drives the standard policy
calculus. Suppose that a profit-maximizing firm devotes its appropriation budget to protect 100% of the gains generated by its innovation
investment through the adoption and enforcement of patent instruments. Now suppose that patents are abolished and therefore drop
out of the appropriation portfolio. Does this affect the firm’s ability to
capture the gains from its investment ex post and hence its innovation
incentives ex ante? Following a conventional analysis, the outcome is
clearly determinate (so determinate that the question appears rhetorical): access costs will fall given the withdrawal of patent protection
and the resulting expansion of the public domain, which in turn will
cause innovation gains to fall as firms anticipate reduced appropriation capacities. But this reflects a static approach that fails to take into
account market responses to changes in intellectual property protection. Following a dynamic approach, the outcome is indeterminate
without further information. Firms may respond to the withdrawal of
patent protection by migrating to alternative instruments that make up
most of any lost appropriation capacity, in which case even a nontrivial
reduction in patent coverage has a trivial effect in reducing access costs
41
and innovation returns. Even more dramatically, as argued further in
subsection I.C.4, firms may migrate to alternative instruments that surpass any withdrawn appropriation capacities, in which case a nontrivial reduction in patent coverage has the nontrivial but perverse effect
of increasing access costs and reducing innovation returns.
In contrast to the single determinate outcome anticipated in standard commentary, a dynamic analysis contemplates multiple possible
outcomes following any downward adjustment in intellectual property. Each outcome, however, can be anticipated at some level of approximation as a function of the direction and size of any incentive/access effect as a result of the reduction in intellectual property
coverage. Where the direction is positive (i.e., less IP reduces innovation gains and access costs), then the effect is “nonperverse”; and
41

Note that my distinction between “static” and “dynamic” approaches does not
track the distinction, sometimes made in intellectual property (and antitrust) commentary, between a static efficiency approach, which seeks to align market pricing with
marginal cost (and therefore implies weak or no intellectual property rights), and a
dynamic efficiency approach, which seeks to enable innovators to recover the fixed costs
of research and development (and therefore implies strong intellectual property rights).

Is Intellectual Property Trivial?

2009]

1713

where size is substantial, the effect is “nontrivial,” and vice versa. If,
for simplicity, we use binary assignments of positive/negative values
for direction and large/small values for size, then these outcomes can
be derived based on the interaction between these two variables, as
shown in Table 1 below. In case A, direction is positive and size is
large, in which case innovation gains and access costs are reduced, following the standard incentives/access tradeoff; in case B, direction is
positive but size is small, in which case the incentive/access tradeoff
holds but to a trivial extent; and in case C, size is large but direction is
negative, in which case innovation gains are reduced but access costs
are increased, thereby partially reversing the standard incentives/access tradeoff.
Table 1: Possible Effects of Downward Adjustment in
Intellectual Property Coverage

Direction (positive)
Direction (negative)

Size (large)

Size (small)

A—Nonperverse, Nontrivial
C—Perverse, Nontrivial

B—Nonperverse, Trivial
—

A conventional static analysis views direction and size as fixed values: direction is always positive and size is always large, in which case
the nonperverse, nontrivial result (case A) anticipated by standard
commentary always and exclusively applies. But a dynamic analysis anticipates that both size and direction may vary. Size will vary as determined by the value of D, which denotes the difference in the per-unit
cost of coverage between the relevant intellectual property entitlement and the remaining portfolio of alternative instruments. Suppose
that D = Ka – Kb , where Ka equals the cost per unit of coverage provided by the relevant intellectual property instrument and Kb equals
the cost per unit of coverage provided by alternative instruments.
Standard analysis assumes (without demonstrating) that it is always the
case that the value of Kb is infinite or exorbitant relative to the value of
Ka , in which case Ka < Kb and D < 0. This assumption implies that the
firm will decline to adopt any alternative instrument in order to cure
the appropriability shortfall, which means, in turn, that innovation
gains and access costs always correlate positively with entitlement
strength following the standard policy calculus (case A above). However, if we contemplate an unlimited range of negative and positive
values for D (which is to say, we contemplate that the value of Kb is not
always infinite or exorbitant relative to the value of Ka and may some-
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times fall below it), then the standard relationship no longer necessarily holds to any substantial extent and can even be reversed. Specifically, two contrary outcomes may be obtained: (i) where Ka = Kb , then
D = 0 (or, more realistically, Ka § Kb , so that D § 0) and there is no effect or no substantial effect (case B above); and (ii) where Ka > Kb ,
then D > 0, and, under certain additional assumptions described be42
low, there can be a perverse effect (case C above).
Below, I explore in greater detail these idealized cases, presented
in the form of four stylized scenarios that exhibit different incentive
effects and access effects consequent to downward adjustments in intellectual property protection. These include (i) two “simple” scenarios that demonstrate the extreme cases where there are no or perfect
substitutes for intellectual property protection (corresponding to
cases A and B above, respectively) and (ii) two “complex” scenarios
where there exists a range of imperfect substitutes for intellectual
property protection (corresponding to the perverse case C above and
a variant of nontrivial case A). Each scenario exhibits standard or
nonstandard effects on incentive gains and access costs as a result of
two factors: (i) the distribution of per-unit costs of coverage across
available appropriation instruments; and (ii) the distribution of units
of coverage across available appropriation instruments. The following
discussion identifies more precisely the conditions under which
downward adjustments in intellectual property are and are not likely
to exert any effect on innovation gains and access costs and, as a result, the conditions under which the standard incentives/access
tradeoff is and is not likely to provide a reliable guideline for policy
analysis of changes to intellectual property protections.
1. Simple Scenario I: Certainly Nontrivial, Nonperverse Effect
In Simple Scenario I, the cost of alternative instruments in the
firm’s appropriation portfolio is exorbitant or infinite relative to the
cost of abolished intellectual property instruments. This would be satisfied in the case where there exists no substitute for intellectual property protection. Somewhat remarkably, given the substantial body of
42

Some readers may observe that this perverse result, where a reduction in intellectual property coverage causes firms to purchase higher levels of coverage through a
less costly, alternative instrument, begs the question of why a firm would have ever
used the costlier (and now unavailable) legal instrument to achieve less coverage. The
answer is that stronger protection may degrade the value of the product, in which case
lower levels of coverage may maximize profits if firms must accept a sufficient discount
on “excessively” protected goods. For further discussion, see infra subsection I.C.4.
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43

empirical evidence to the contrary, this is the case that drives most
legal and economic analysis of intellectual property, which assumes
that intellectual goods that are legally unprotected by intellectual
property entitlements are actually unprotected. That is, any asset that
44
is not protected by law falls into the open-access public domain.
Where this assumption is maintained, any downward adjustment in
intellectual property is clearly nontrivial and yields all of the standard
effects: reduced innovation incentives and increased access costs,
which then requires that normative analysis proceed on the basis of
the standard incentives/access tradeoff. But that is a result that simply
follows by construction from an artificial set of assumptions that will
infrequently or even rarely be satisfied in any practical setting. Clearly
this is not the paradigm case that should govern policy discussions of
intellectual property.
2. Simple Scenario II: Certainly Trivial, Nonperverse Effect
In Simple Scenario II, the cost of alternative instruments is equal
or approximately equal to the cost of abolished or curtailed intellectual property instruments. This would be satisfied in the case where
there is an exact substitute for intellectual property protection. Under this assumption, it self-evidently follows that eliminating intellectual property protection makes no difference since firms can substitute other instruments to achieve the same level of protection, in
which case none of the standard effects follow: more or less intellectual property protection has no effect on innovation incentives or access costs and hence does not generate the conventional incentives/access tradeoff for purposes of normative analysis. Clearly this,
too, is not the paradigm case that should govern policy discussions of
intellectual property.
3. Complex Scenario I: Potentially Nontrivial, Nonperverse Effect
Simple Scenario I is obviously unrealistic. It must almost always be
the case that firms have some other feasible instrument by which to
raise competitors’ imitation costs to some extent, and empirical inquiries suggest that those alternative instruments typically raise competitors’ imitation costs by a substantial amount. But this scenario can
easily be modified by simply assuming that the cost of alternative in43
44

See supra Section I.B.
See supra note 1.
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struments less the cost of abolished or curtailed intellectual property
instruments yields a positive but nonexorbitant value. This would be
satisfied in a world where there exist materially but not radically costlier alternatives to intellectual property protection. Under this assumption, eliminating or curtailing intellectual property has a nontrivial effect to the extent that a firm’s reallocation of its fixed
appropriation budget to the next-least-costly set of substitute instruments will not fully replicate the protection formerly provided by intellectual property.
The direction of this effect is clear and follows standard expectations: the relaxation of intellectual property protection results in reduced coverage of the relevant pool of intellectual goods, in which
case access is decreased, innovation incentives are reduced, and normative evaluation can proceed on the basis of the standard incentives/access tradeoff. But note that the size of this effect is not clear:
that is, whether this certain effect is weakly or strongly nontrivial depends on the relative distance between the lapsed intellectual property instruments and the next-least-costly combination of alternative
instruments. Where that distance has a small value, downward adjustments in intellectual property coverage can reduce incentives and
increase access by only a small magnitude. Where that distance has a
large value, however, abolishing intellectual property protection may
make a significant difference, as the next-least-costly instrument
stands at a considerable distance from the lapsed intellectual property
instrument. In this latter case, firms will be unable to incur the incremental nontrivial costs of covering the entire shortfall by substituting toward alternative instruments. Where it costs substantially more
to replicate the coverage formerly provided by intellectual property
instruments, downward adjustments in intellectual property roughly
follow conventional expectations: incentives are reduced and access is
increased by nontrivial magnitudes, in which case normative analysis
can proceed on the basis of the standard incentives/access tradeoff.
This familiar nontrivial case is illustrated using hypothetical values
in Table 2, below. Suppose that a record label spends $10 to purchase
100 units of coverage for each digital release through a copyright entitlement (which yields a per-unit cost of coverage equal to $0.10); then
suppose that copyright protection is abolished or widely ignored in
the relevant jurisdiction; and finally, suppose that the firm can spend
the same $10 per release to implement a contractual license that can
only deliver 80 units of coverage (which yields a per-unit cost of coverage equal to $0.125). That is, the contractual substitute exerts inferior
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appropriation capacities relative to copyright protection, with the result that the firm internalizes a smaller portion of its innovation investment while third parties incur lower access costs. The relaxation of
intellectual property protection causes a rise in the per-unit cost of
coverage available to the resource holder, which in turn causes a fall in
the number of units of coverage that can be purchased, which in turn
limits the price that the producer can demand. Following the standard
incentives/access tradeoff, access by third parties is increased at the
price of reduced profits and incentives on the part of the innovator.
Table 2: Nontrivial, Nonperverse Outcome: Less IP
45
Reduces Gains, Increases Access

No Protection
Copyright Protection
Next-Least-Costly Protection

Units of
Coverage

Total Cost of
Coverage

Price

Profits

0
100
80

$0
$10
$10

$0
$40
$32

$0
$30
$22

4. Complex Scenario II: Potentially Nontrivial, Perverse Effect
Recall that a dynamic analysis proposes that relaxations in intellectual property coverage induce all firms to migrate to the next-leastcostly instrument in their appropriation portfolio so as to maintain
46
their appropriation capacities to the maximum extent possible. Assuming a fixed budget of appropriation resources, this implies that, if
there is anything but perfect cost equivalence between intellectual
property and alternative instruments, then any reduction in intellectual property coverage always yields some reduction in appropriation
capacities, and hence, some reduction in anticipated innovation gains.
Using the same amount of appropriation resources, firms that substitute toward the next-least-costly appropriation instrument will neces-

45

Note that the figures in the “Profits” column assume that “cost of coverage” is
the sole marginal cost (so profits equal price minus cost of coverage). This reflects a
market where (i) the marginal cost of production and distribution is zero, and hence
(ii) the vendor’s pricing power is entirely derived from the exclusivity that it can establish through appropriation instruments, whether intellectual property or other devices.
This would seem to describe the online music market, the provisional example discussed above. For simplicity, I exclude the vendor’s fixed costs.
46
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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sarily be able to purchase fewer units of coverage than had previously
been made available through the lapsed intellectual property entitlement. If this is the case, then the direction of the access and incentive
effects of “more or less IP” is certain, but the size is uncertain, contingent solely on the difference in the per-unit cost of coverage provided
by the next-least-costly appropriation instrument relative to the lapsed
intellectual property instrument. So the effect is always nonperverse—less IP always means lower access costs and lower innovation
gains—but the magnitude may or may not be nontrivial.
But even the direction may be uncertain. The nonperverse result
implicitly assumes that a firm can always purchase precisely the number of units of coverage that it desires, but at increasing costs per unit
of coverage as it moves through its appropriation portfolio. This ensures that a firm’s substitution of the next-least-costly instrument in its
portfolio would always provide coverage at some level that is lower
than the preexisting level of coverage: given a fixed appropriation
budget and a higher per-unit cost of coverage, the firm is forced to
settle for a reduced appropriation capacity. However, even the direction of the effect could be uncertain if alternative instruments deliver
units of coverage in “lumpy” quantities, such that the next-least-costly
instrument (again, on a per-unit basis) offers more units of coverage
than the firm had previously purchased using the withdrawn intellectual property entitlement. In that case, the next-least-costly appropriation instrument can only deliver appropriation capacities in an
amount that exceeds the firm’s appropriation budget. If we maintain
the assumption of a fixed appropriation budget, the firm must then
settle for zero appropriation capacities (since the minimum number
of units of coverage that are available would exceed the budget); if we
relax that assumption, the firm may divert resources from other uses to
purchase a stronger but non-profit-maximizing amount of coverage.
A simple numerical example can illustrate this contingency, which
is then presented in Table 3(a) below. Suppose, as above, that a record label spends $10 to purchase 100 units of coverage for each digital release through a copyright entitlement (which yields a per-unit
cost of coverage equal to $0.10); then suppose that copyright protection is abolished in the relevant jurisdiction; and finally, suppose that
the firm can spend $25 per release to implement a DRM technology
that can deliver “packages” of at least 200 units of coverage (which
yields a per-unit cost of coverage equal to $0.125). In this scenario,
the technological substitute is superior to copyright protection, with
the result that the firm internalizes a greater portion of its innovation
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investment, and third parties incur higher access costs under a lower
(zero) level of copyright protection.
But why would the firm not simply have used this more potent but
more expensive instrument previously? If we assume a fixed appropriation budget, then the answer is straightforward: the firm could
not afford it. If we relax that assumption, then we can hypothesize
that the firm may have rationally declined to use this more potent alternative instrument because it degraded the value of its product,
thereby limiting the price that it could demand from consumers, so
that the firm maximizes profits at some imperfect level of protection
against third-party access. However, given the absence of copyright
protection, it may now be profit maximizing for the record label to
employ this once-disfavored alternative: that is, if the firm now faces a
choice between zero units of coverage (at $0), which will invite free
imitation and push down price to marginal cost (assumed to be $0),
and excessive units of coverage (200 units at $25), which will still yield
some positive profits, it will rationally select the latter as its “secondbest” option. The firm would not have selected this option if the appropriation portfolio still included an intermediate level of coverage
(100 units at $10). This result is set forth in tabular form below, using
hypothetical values to illustrate the stylized results.
Table 3(a): Nontrivial, Perverse Outcome:
47
Less IP Reduces Gains and Access

No Protection
Copyright Protection
Next-Least-Costly Protection

Units of
Coverage

Total Cost of
Coverage

Price

Profits

0
100
200

$0
$10
$25

$0
$40
$35

$0
$30
$10

There is an interesting alternative to this hypothetical, whereby a
perverse result can be reached without relaxing the assumption of a
fixed appropriation budget. Suppose all the facts and hypothetical
values stated above, except that DRM technology delivers 200 units of
coverage at $10 per release (rather than $25 as supposed above). This
would mean that DRM represents the firm’s “next-most-costly” appropriation technology as compared to copyright and therefore com47

See supra note 45 for some assumptions behind these values.
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fortably fits within its appropriation budget. Put differently, the
lapsed intellectual property entitlement delivered coverage at a higher
per-unit cost (100 units of coverage for $10, yielding a per-unit cost of
coverage equal to $0.10) relative to the alternative appropriation instrument (200 units of coverage for $10, yielding a per-unit cost of
coverage equal to $0.05). But the firm will nonetheless accept this
deal with reluctance: given that it must purchase at least 200 units of
coverage, use of the DRM technology sufficiently degrades the value
of the firm’s product such that its profits are lower than they would be
in a world in which copyright protection exists (but still higher than
the zero profits obtained without purchasing any protection). Even
though the DRM technology is more potent and has a lower per-unit
cost of coverage relative to copyright, the firm maximizes profits by
using the weaker and less cost-effective form of coverage. This is reflected in the following table.
Table 3(b): Nontrivial, Perverse Outcome:
48
Less IP Reduces Gains and Access

No Protection
Copyright Protection
Next-Most-Costly Protection

Units of
Coverage

Total Cost of
Coverage

Price

Profits

0
100
200

$0
$10
$10

$0
$40
$35

$0
$30
$25

Both cases illustrate that the directional effect of any downward adjustment in intellectual property coverage can be perverse: that is,
depending on the composition of the firm’s appropriation portfolio,
relaxing intellectual property protections can induce migration to an
alternative instrument that is more potent than the lapsed intellectual
property instrument and therefore increases access costs. At the same
time, innovation incentives are reduced under a higher level of coverage because the firm earns lower profits due to product degradation:
that is, reducing copyright protection forces the firm to utilize alterna49
tive instruments at non-profit-maximizing levels. Where intellectual

48

See supra note 45 for some assumptions behind these values.
This possibility is vividly illustrated by the animal-breeding industry, where breeders apparently remedied the appropriability shortfall created by weak or nonexistent intellectual property protection by imposing strict contractual limitations and employing
in-breeding practices to maintain control over livestock. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Response,
49
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property protection is constrained, firms may rationally migrate to
draconian alternative instruments that result in product degradation
but nonetheless enhance profits relative to having no protection at all.
In short, intellectual property can be nontrivial but perverse: less IP
can reduce innovation incentives—following conventional expectations—while also increasing access costs—contrary to conventional
50
expectations.
II. WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS NOT TRIVIAL (SOMETIMES)
The discussion above has identified conditions under which
downward adjustments in intellectual property coverage are likely to
exert a trivial effect on access costs and innovation incentives, in
which case innovative output will be roughly constant across the broad
range of weak to strong intellectual property regimes. In this Part, I
identify the conditions under which adjustments in intellectual property coverage can make a difference, not as an incentive instrument
for regulating innovative output, but as a distributive instrument that
shifts innovation rents from the holders of higher-cost appropriation
instruments to the holders of lower-cost appropriation instruments.
A. An Unconventional View of Intellectual Property
In the foregoing discussion, I have set forth a few simple, preliminary propositions:

Fragile Equilibria, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/01/22/dreyfuss.
50
There is an interesting “virtuous” variant of this perverse scenario. If we suppose an upward adjustment in intellectual property protections and assume a sufficiently lumpy distribution of units of coverage across appropriation instruments, then
increasing intellectual property can sometimes increase innovation gains (following
the standard outcome) but decrease access costs (contrary to the standard outcome).
This will be possible where the previous low (or zero) level of intellectual property protection compelled the firm to select a non-profit-maximizing, excessive number of
units of coverage provided by an alternative instrument. An increase in intellectual
property coverage enables the firm to select a lower number of units of coverage,
thereby avoiding product degradation and increasing the price that can be demanded
from consumers. Applying the same analysis as used to generate the “perverse” outcomes identified above, this result can hold under a certain range of values whether
the per-unit cost of coverage provided by the intellectual property instrument is more
or less expensive than the existing alternative instrument (i.e., whether the alternative
instrument is the next-least-costly or next-most-costly instrument in the firm’s appropriation portfolio).
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Unconventional Proposition I : Intellectual property has a trivial
effect on innovation incentives given perfect or near-perfect
cost equivalence between intellectual property and alternative
instruments.
Unconventional Proposition II : Intellectual property has a nontrivial effect on innovation incentives where there is a lack of
perfect or near-perfect cost equivalence between intellectual
property and alternative instruments. The size of this effect,
however, may be weakly nontrivial where there is no substantial difference between the cost of any lapsed formal instrument and the next-least-costly alternative instrument.
Unconventional Proposition III : Intellectual property has a nontrivial but perverse effect on innovation incentives if we assume (i) a substantial cost difference between intellectual
property and alternative instruments, and (ii) a lumpy distribution of the “units of coverage” across appropriation technologies such that the firm reallocates resources to the nextleast-costly (or even next-most-costly) instrument that delivers
more units of coverage than the lapsed intellectual property
instrument.
These propositions collectively illustrate a fundamental thesis:
there is no ground to presume the standard positive correlation between entitlement strength, on the one hand, and innovation incentives (more IP means more output) and access costs (more IP means
more access costs), on the other hand, unless we assume that firms can
only use alternative instruments at a substantially higher per-unit cost
of coverage relative to intellectual property entitlements. Where
there is substantial cost equivalence between legal and extralegal instruments, the incentives/access tradeoff has considerably less force.
Even substantial downward adjustments in intellectual property have
no appreciable effect on access costs, in which case (everything else
being equal) innovation incentives are substantially unaffected and
technological or creative output should be roughly constant. Moreover, even if the underlying assumption is satisfied—that is, even if
there is not substantial cost equivalence, but alternative instruments
deliver coverage in sufficiently “lumpy” quantities—then the former,
but not the latter, correlation will hold true. That is, decreasing entitlement strength may lower output following conventional expectations but increase access costs contrary to expectations. Firms will rationally substitute toward appropriation instruments that deliver more
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coverage at a higher total cost (which can imply a higher or lower perunit cost) than the firm would otherwise be willing to fund. In short,
the incentive/access tradeoff will sometimes yield a lose-lose result:
51
less IP delivers both less output and less access.
I will now focus on Unconventional Proposition II, which will, at
varying magnitudes, yield the conventional positive correlation between entitlement strength and innovation incentives and access costs.
Intuitively, this seems to capture most broadly the typical appropriation landscape in which firms tend to operate in most markets: neither the extreme scenario where there are no substitutes for intellectual property (Simple Scenario I) nor the extreme scenario where
alternatives to intellectual property are perfect substitutes (Simple
Scenario II). If we assume—as seems at least reasonable based on
available evidence—that firms typically do have access to a wide range
of alternative instruments at some nonexorbitant incremental cost,
then it would follow that, in a large number of circumstances, even
substantial downward adjustments in intellectual property protection
are trivial or do not have a substantial effect with respect to innovation
incentives and access costs. However, even if we are comfortable with
the existing evidence on this point in some markets, we should preserve some meaningful scope of application for the conventional “IP
matters” thesis. To hold that reductions in intellectual property coverage make no or little difference with respect to innovation gains and
access costs requires a further assumption: namely, it must be the case
that the costs of implementing substantially equivalent appropriation
instruments are distributed roughly equally among actual and potential market participants. If that is not the case, then only a partial indifference thesis holds: while a reduction in intellectual property coverage will have a trivial effect on total innovation gains and total access
costs, it will have a nontrivial effect on the distribution of innovation
gains and access costs among the total pool of market participants.
Recall the extreme case where there is perfect cost equivalence
between intellectual property and an alternative instrument in the
form of a perfect technological lock. Obviously, stronger or weaker
intellectual property coverage makes no difference in firms’ total appropriation capacities, in which case innovation gains and access costs
should be unaffected. Now suppose two firms, A and B, each of which

51

Conversely, as noted supra note 50, there are plausible circumstances where increases in intellectual property protections can deliver a win-win result: more IP delivers both more output and more access.
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are contemplating making expenditures to develop, produce, and distribute mutually noninfringing technologies that will exhibit roughly
comparable cost and noncost attributes, except (i) A expects that it
can protect its product against imitation by using the lock at a cost
equivalent to enforcing available patent protections, and (ii) B expects that it can only do so at some substantially higher cost. Then
stronger or weaker intellectual property clearly does matter in influencing the distribution of rents across firms, for the simple reason
that only A can expect to accrue rents without patent protection. If
patent protection is available, both firms enter, and all rents in the
market are split equally between A and B, who are protected against
outside entry; without patent protection, however, only A rationally
enters, and therefore accrues all available rents in the market, while B
52
rationally declines to make any investment at all.
This hypothetical identifies circumstances where total rents in the
market hold approximately constant irrespective of radical changes in
intellectual property, but the distribution of those rents among individual firms in the market is radically altered. This case (of which
multiple intermediate variants could be imagined) illustrates a simple
proposition: so long as we assume an unequal distribution of costequivalent alternative instruments, less IP inherently advantages firms
that have the lowest costs of substituting toward alternative instruments, while more IP will inherently ameliorate any such cost advantage, thereby sustaining firms that have the highest costs of substituting toward alternative instruments.
This yields an additional proposition:
Unconventional Proposition IV : Intellectual property has (i) a
trivial effect on innovation output if there is substantial cost
equivalence between intellectual property and alternative instruments, but (ii) a nontrivial effect on the distribution of
innovation gains across firms if substantially cost-equivalent alternative instruments are unequally distributed across actual
and potential market participants.
52

This hypothetical assumes that (i) where both A and B enter, tacit collusion preserves supracompetitive rents, and (ii) where only A enters, B would not invest simply
to exploit the opportunity to accrue the short-term gains from underpricing A, so long
as B would still be unable to recover its fixed-cost R&D expenditures, resulting in an
anticipated net loss. Presumably B could not extract a portion of A’s anticipated monopoly rents by threatening to sell its technology to a third party, so long as informational asymmetries (which are especially severe prior to product development, as assumed above) render any such threat sufficiently noncredible.
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We can therefore suppose a market where, following element (i),
even complete elimination of intellectual property protection has little or no effect on total innovation output because firms taken as a
whole recover appropriation capacities through extralegal instruments. However, following element (ii), the absence of intellectual
property selects against firms that have the highest-cost access to alternative, cost-equivalent appropriation instruments while it selects for
firms that have the lowest-cost access. Thus, intellectual property is
trivial as an incentive instrument but nontrivial as a distributive instrument. Put differently, assuming a robust supply of alternative exclusionary instruments, the total amount of innovation rents under a
stronger or weaker intellectual property regime is roughly invariant
while the distribution of rents varies considerably.
Extrapolating from Unconventional Proposition IV, we can now
state more completely the conditions under which intellectual property will and will not matter. Specifically, more or less intellectual
property has completely trivial effects where two conditions are met: (i)
there is substantial cost equivalence between intellectual property and
alternative instruments, and (ii) cost-equivalent alternative instruments are distributed roughly equally across firms. Where assumption
(i) is not satisfied, then intellectual property is nontrivial as an incentive instrument; where assumption (ii) is not satisfied, then intellectual property is nontrivial as a distributive instrument. Where both assumptions are satisfied, then intellectual property is trivial in both
respects. This taxonomy of possible outcomes is summarized in Table
4, below.
Table 4: Incentive and Distributive Effects of Intellectual Property
Equal Distribution

Unequal Distribution

Cost Equivalence

Completely Trivial

Trivial Incentive Effect;
Nontrivial Distributive
Effect

Non–Cost Equivalence

Nontrivial Incentive Effect;
Trivial Distributive Effect

Completely Nontrivial

These multiple outcomes stand in contrast to conventional commentary, which effectively presumes without contemplation that the
“Completely Nontrivial” result is the only possible result. In particu-
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lar, these results pose a challenge to two standard assumptions in
scholarly and popular discussions of intellectual property. First, these
results show that there is no determinative incentive effect of weaker or
53
stronger intellectual property coverage, absent information as to the
distribution across alternative instruments of the costs of coverage
(and, to be complete, information as to the distribution of units of
coverage across alternative instruments, which can give rise to perverse outcomes). Second, even where there is substantial cost equivalence, and, therefore, innovative output should be roughly constant
across different levels of intellectual property coverage, there is no determinative distributive effect of weaker or stronger intellectual property coverage, absent information as to the distribution across firms of
the costs of using alternative instruments.
Scholarly and popular commentary normally assume that stronger
intellectual property coverage has regressive distributive effects by
shifting rents toward large firms that then enjoy strengthened barriers
against market entry; and conversely, that weaker intellectual property
coverage has progressive distributive effects by lowering entry barriers
and shifting rents toward users and small firms that have limited access to alternative appropriation technologies. Take a typical example
from a recent contribution, where the author states that allocating
strong intellectual property rights presents a policy tradeoff between
increasing innovation incentives by improving anticipated profits and
raising barriers to entry by consolidating control over a particular in54
dustry. That statement makes the implicit (and seemingly uncontroversial) assumption that a world with stronger intellectual property
rights will necessarily impose higher entry costs, and therefore exhibit
higher market concentration, relative to a world with weaker intellectual property rights. But that assumption can easily be falsified. Consider a counterexample: in the late nineteenth century, U.S. railroads
formed information clearinghouses to which member firms disclosed

53

This refers to the standard positive correlation between innovation incentives
and intellectual property protections. See supra Section I.A.
54
Tim Wu, Essay, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA.
L. REV. 123, 123-26 (2006). This example is merely indicative of a long-standing argument in intellectual property commentary. For a historical example, see TEMP. NAT’L
ECON. COMM., 76TH CONG., PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE (S. Comm. Print 1941)
(prepared by Walton Hamilton), in ROBERT P. MERGES & JANE C. GINSBURG, FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 46 (2004), which argues that during the nineteenth
century patent rights foreclosed entry by individual inventors into mature technological fields while individual inventors flourished in any field where patent rights were
absent.
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technical knowledge, apparently in order to generate a large body of
prior art that could operate to strike down any nonmember patent
55
claims. Consistent with this interpretation, member firms advised
each other on how to innovate so as to design around nonmembers’
patents and lobbied for legislative and judicial changes to limit patent
56
damages and effect other favorable changes in the patent laws.
This result seems anomalous under a conventional static analysis
of intellectual property coverage. But a dynamic analysis of intellectual property coverage fully anticipates this outcome insofar as it does
not make any directionally uniform assumption as to the distributive
effects of weaker or stronger levels of legal protection against thirdparty imitation. Weaker patent rights most likely protected the market position of incumbents in the railroad industry, who were well
sheltered against entry by the large fixed capital costs required to enter the industry. This observation can be generalized. If we anticipate
that firms respond to adjustments in intellectual property coverage by
substituting toward market alternatives in order to sustain appropriation capacities and assume that firms do not incur equal costs in exploiting alternative instruments, it follows that stronger intellectual
property rights can easily reduce entry costs and endanger incumbents’
market position. The distributive effects of weaker or stronger intellectual property coverage therefore depend on the relative costs incurred by different firms to substitute toward alternative instruments.
Following that formulation, there is no ground to expect, as a general
matter, that the standard distributive effect of upward and downward
adjustments in intellectual property will be uniformly regressive or
progressive, respectively. But this observation does not consign policy
analysis to mere guesswork: the same dynamic framework supplies an
analytical instrument by which to anticipate reasonably the distributive
effects of adjustments in intellectual property coverage based on a
well-defined set of relevant variables. I will now consider these distributive effects in greater detail.

55

See Steven W. Usselman, Patents Purloined: Railroads, Inventors, and the Diffusion of
Innovation in 19th-Century America, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 1047, 1049 (1991) (“By pooling information regarding technical experiments and coordinating legal action, railroads developed the ability to establish precedence that could invalidate most patent
claims against them.”).
56
See id. at 1064-74 (chronicling the collusive behavior of railroad patent associations).
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B. Distributive Effects of Intellectual Property
Two typical scenarios can be envisioned that reverse or fail to replicate the standard distributive outcomes associated with upward or
downward adjustments in intellectual property coverage: (i) “vertical”
distributive effects, whereby rents are shifted from small-firm entrants
to large-firm incumbents, and (ii) “horizontal” distributive effects,
whereby rents are shifted among large firms situated roughly at the
same level of industrial organization. Both effects are a function of
the relative costs that firms incur in migrating to alternative appropriation instruments, but only the former effect is likely to be an outcome that demands policy intervention from a social point of view.
1. Vertical Distributive Effects
The business-management and industrial-organization literatures
widely agree that large, established firms have greater access to alternative appropriation instruments relative to smaller entrants. This is
largely due to the fact that most of these instruments—firm goodwill,
economies of scale, and production and distribution capacities and
efficiencies—are inherent by-products of the vertically integrated
forms of organization and/or long-term market positions that tend to
57
characterize incumbent firms. Following this observation, the standard distributive result attributed to intellectual property is largely reversed: weaker intellectual property will have regressive effects by providing large firms with an appropriation-cost advantage over any
potential small-firm competitor that must incur greater costs to replicate the incumbent’s appropriation capacities. Under that same assumption, stronger intellectual property will have progressive effects by
providing small firms with a tool by which to combat the natural appropriation-cost advantage of larger firms. That is, weak intellectual
property can act as a barrier to entry that protects the market position
of incumbents while strong intellectual property can act as a critical
tool by which entrants can challenge incumbents’ market position.
Without patent protection, small-firm innovators (who, notably, are not
part of the sample sets in the aforementioned survey studies that cast
58
doubt on the relative importance of patent protection ) are arguably
57

For statements to this effect, see David B. Audretsch & Zoltan J. Acs, Innovation
as a Means of Entry: An Overview, in ENTRY AND MARKET CONTESTABILITY 222, 224-25
(P.A. Geroski & J. Schwalbach eds., 1991), and Gary P. Pisano, The R&D Boundaries of
the Firm: An Empirical Analysis, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 153, 155 (1990).
58
See supra note 15.
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left to the mercy of established large firms and will, therefore, have sub59
stantially reduced incentives to undertake innovation projects.
This intuition is amply confirmed by historical lobbying behavior
in the patent context, which shows that small inventors (or investment
entities that fund small inventors) tend to promote strong intellectual
property coverage while large technology-dependent firms (outside of
pharmaceuticals and chemicals) tend to promote moderate and
60
sometimes even weak or zero levels of intellectual property coverage.
Following a dynamic analysis of adjustments in intellectual property
coverage, this is an unsurprising outcome. Small firms rationally anticipate that any withdrawal of intellectual property coverage will operate to the advantage of larger firms, which bear fewer incremental
costs in curing the resulting appropriability shortfall by recourse to alternative instruments. Conversely, large firms rationally anticipate
that any withdrawal of intellectual property coverage will operate to
the disadvantage of small firms, which bear larger incremental costs in
curing the resulting appropriability shortfall by recourse to alternative
instruments.
2. Horizontal Distributive Effects
The distributive effects of stronger or weaker intellectual property
coverage may simply amount to socially indifferent resource transfers
among large firms, none of which presents a plausible candidate for
distributive equity. Suppose that an intellectual property entitlement
is abolished and firms can recover at least some appropriation capacities by recourse to complementary assets that are not accessible at
equal cost by all market participants. Reconsider our earlier hypothetical, in which copyright is no longer available to protect digitally
released musical works, but with one modification: record labels have
little access to substitute instruments for copyright but other entities
have abundant access. This is not a far cry from the real world. The
effective erosion of copyright protection over recorded music appears

59

Several authors make similar observations. See Levin et al., supra note 15, at 797;
Richard Gilbert & Zvi Griliches, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research & Development: Comments and Discussion, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 787,
831; Cohen et al., supra note 15, at 2-3.
60
See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 39-42, on file with author) [hereinafter Barnett, Property as Process] (examining this phenomenon in the financial-services, information-technology, and semiconductor industries).
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61

to injure the record labels while benefiting hardware manufacturers—such as Apple—and original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs)—which sell portable media devices—whose utility increases
62
as the cost of storable content falls. Similarly, this erosion benefits
ticket-selling, concert-promotion, and venue-management companies,
which derive revenues from the sale of tickets to live performances,
63
which are in turn promoted by the diffusion of free musical content.
Downward adjustments in intellectual property coverage will then
have little impact on total innovation rents but will shift those rents
across firms, or even markets, so that entities that incur the lowest cost
of accessing the substitute appropriation technology will tend to capture market share from entities that do not. Thus, the erosion of
copyright in music may have little effect on the total rents generated
by musical output, but it nonetheless operates to the great detriment
of the record labels, which have relatively higher-cost access to any alternative instruments; and to the great benefit of hardware manufacturers and concert promoters, which have relatively lower-cost access
to complementary assets that enable holders to capture at least some
of the rents generated by music production, which now operates as a

61

For reviews and independent research relating to the economic injury suffered
by record labels as a result of piracy, see Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2006), and Martin Peitz & Paul Waelbroeck, The Effect of Internet Piracy on Music Sales: Cross-Section Evidence, 1 REV. ECON.
RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 71, 78 (2004).
62
See Michael A. Einhorn, Gorillas in Our Midst: Searching for King Kong in the Music
Jungle, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 145, 153 (2008) (observing that Apple sells its iTunes
downloads at no profit in order to sell iPods); A Catchy New Tune: After a Decade of Chaos,
Has the Record Industry Finally Hit upon the Right Model?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4th–10th 2008,
at 14 (observing that the delivery of music to complement the iPod and other portable
devices offers an alternative to the traditional music business model based on the direct sale of recorded music); Dan Moren, Apple Is Music Industry’s Public Enemy No. 1,
MACWORLD, May 30, 2008, http://www.macworld.com/article/133694/2008/05/
drmenemy.html (stating that record labels have lost their historical control over music
distribution as Apple now dominates the market for online music downloads).
63
See Einhorn, supra note 62, at 158 (noting that concert-promotion companies
now occupy important positions in the music industry, with Live Nation being “the
largest promoter of live concerts in the world” and “the second-largest entertainment
and management company in the world”); A Change of Tune: Faced with Shrinking Profits, Record Labels Are Touting a New Approach, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2007, at 64, 64-65 (noting that concert revenues have been rising as CD sales, which increasingly serve primarily to advance performance revenues, have been falling); Ethan Smith, Rock’s New
Republic, WSJ., Winter 2008, at 76 (stating that Live Nation, the leading promoter of
live concert performances, is seeking to take the place of record labels as the primary
intermediary in the music industry, encompassing music, concert, and merchandise
market segments).
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“loss leader” to facilitate the sales of concert tickets and consumerelectronics devices. So long as incentive effects at the production and
distribution levels are largely unchanged (which, to be sure, is still an
open empirical question), the associated selection effects—whereby
the record industry loses but the hardware and concert-promotion industries win—is a matter of social indifference from a distributive
point of view.
III. WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAY BE INDIRECTLY
NONTRIVIAL (SOMETIMES)
The discussion above has yielded the following proposition: more
or less intellectual property sometimes makes little difference in the
total amount of innovation rents but great difference in the allocation
of innovation rents among various participants in the market based on
their relative costs of exploiting alternative appropriation instruments.
This proposition nicely tracks two otherwise irreconcilable but wellestablished social facts: (i) there is little evidence that stronger or
weaker intellectual property results in appreciably greater or lesser
64
levels of innovation investment, and (ii) firms and other participants
devote substantial resources to influencing the levels of intellectual
65
property protection made available by the state. If intellectual property makes little difference on the margin as an incentive device, then
result (i) is entirely anticipated; if intellectual property makes a sub64

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Private-firm expenditures on influencing intellectual property legislation are
large by any measure. For examples in copyright and patent, respectively, see WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 16 (2004) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY] (citing data
from the Center for Responsive Politics showing that in 1996, media interests donated
$1.5 million to six of the sponsors of the Copyright Term Extension Act); Posting of
Donald Zuhn to Patent Docs: Biotech & Pharma Patent Law & News Blog, Lobbying
Spending Spree Continues, http://www.patentdocs.org/2008/05/lobbying-spendi.html
(May 20, 2008) (reporting that Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Genentech, AstraZeneca,
and Abbott Laboratories each spent between $1.28 million and $4.4 million on lobbying in 2007, most of which presumably addressed patent reform or related issues).
Firms and industry associations exert influence at the judicial level by regularly filing
amicus curiae briefs in leading litigations. See LANDES & POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY,
supra, at 19; see also Brief of Business Software Alliance, Software and Information Industry Ass’n, Information Technology Industry Council, and Information Technology
Ass’n of America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-0130) (arguing against the Federal Circuit’s
automatic-injunction standard in patent infringement cases); Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3, eBay, 547 U.S. 388
(arguing for the retention of the automatic-injunction standard).
65
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stantial difference on the margin as a distributive device, then result
(ii) is also entirely anticipated. If intellectual property sometimes operates principally as a distributive device for allocating innovation
rents among market participants, then downward or upward adjustments in intellectual property can be reduced to simple politics: intellectual property outcomes mediated by the judicial and/or legislative
processes are socially indifferent reflections of privately self-interested
investments by firms and other participants to maximize their portions of the social pie generated by innovation investment.
Individual firms recognize that stronger or weaker intellectual
property regimes reward or punish firms that have higher-cost or
lower-cost access to certain alternative appropriation technologies and
self-interestedly undertake lobbying actions to generate the level of
intellectual property protection that maximizes the firm’s competitive
cost advantage or minimizes its competitive cost disadvantage. It is no
accident that craft guilds opposed patent protection in the early modern era: this protection represented an appropriation instrument that
would enable individual inventors to overcome the powerful appropriation-cost advantages of the established guild entities, protected by
alternative instruments in the form of goodwill, know-how, and imperfect legal exclusivity over the employment of skilled labor and the sale
66
of certain goods. And it is no accident that record labels vigorously
support copyright protection in our late modern era: this represents
an appropriation instrument that enables them to overcome the appropriation-cost advantages of hardware manufacturers, concert promoters, and other holders of complementary assets, which (unlike record labels) can recoup returns from musical output even in the face
of (or precisely due to) widespread piracy.
At this point, we could take the following view: as a positive matter, intellectual property can and often does make a difference by allocating innovation rents among market participants; however, as a
normative matter, these selection effects are immaterial and therefore
whether there is more or less intellectual property is a matter of indif-
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See CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGPATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 188 (1988) (noting that medieval guildsmen
viewed patents as “an unfair obstruction to the course of their business”); Dominique
Foray & Liliane Hilaire Perez, The Economics of Open Technology: Collective Organisation and
Individual Claims in the “Fabrique Lyonnaise” During the Old Regime, in NEW FRONTIERS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 239, 243-44 (Cristiano Antonelli
et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the eighteenth-century French silk trade, in which monopolies and secrecy were opposed and openness with technology was encouraged).
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ference from a social point of view. But this indifference thesis must
consider a final possibility that is not socially indifferent: namely, that
the distributive outcomes generated by stronger or weaker levels of intellectual property may indirectly exert incentive effects with respect
to the direction (or quality) of innovation investment, even if they exert
no incentive effect with respect to the rate (or quantity) of innovation
67
investment. If that is the case, then changes in intellectual property
protection cannot be reduced to simple politics and implicate a collective interest in maximizing the social value generated by innovation
investment.
If intellectual property is not trivial with respect to incentive effects on the direction of innovation investment, then there must be
some correlation between the types of firms—or, more generally, the
forms of organization and other transactional structures—that are advantaged by stronger or weaker forms of intellectual property and certain types of innovation investment. Stronger levels of intellectual
property coverage logically tend to favor small, relatively unintegrated
firms by overcoming the “natural” appropriation-cost advantage enjoyed by large, relatively integrated firms, which have lower-cost access
to alternative instruments. Conversely, weaker levels of intellectual
property coverage logically tend to favor large firms by exacerbating
their inherent appropriation-cost advantage over entrants that do not
have access to the appropriation technologies inherent in an integrated form of firm organization. If intellectual property is abolished,
then there are few tools available to an unintegrated firm by which to
recover returns from innovation investment in the face of competition
by incumbents that have unique access to alternative instruments, including global distribution networks, production efficiencies, and firm
goodwill. Hence, even if intellectual property has little effect on the
innovative output of the market in general (which will tend to recover
innovation rents through some other mechanism), it may have a great
effect on the transactional and organizational structures used to govern the production and distribution of intellectual goods, which in
turn operates to the advantage of some firms and the disadvantage of
all others.

67

For the original source of the distinction between the “rate” and “direction” of
innovation investments, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION
OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962).
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This proposition can be illustrated briefly by historical changes in
firm organization in the semiconductor industry, which has experienced substantial changes in the enforcement of patents and other
68
intellectual property entitlements. During the several decades prior
to and through the early 1980s, patent rights were generally weak: using this paper’s terminology, the state set an exorbitant price to purchase units of coverage against third-party imitation. During this time,
firms in the industry tended to operate under vertically integrated
structures—that is, each firm independently maintained R&D, production, and distribution capacities—that constrained involuntary
spillovers by limiting outside access to private knowledge at various
points in the product development and supply chain. The high price
of patent protection caused firms to exploit lower-cost appropriation
technologies in order to capture innovation returns and indirectly
raised entry barriers to any firm that could not access those alternative
appropriation technologies at the same or comparable cost.
Starting in the early 1980s, however, patent protection was
strengthened as a result of strong enforcement of patent rights by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which in turn supported
wider adoption and litigation of patent rights in the semiconductor
69
industry in particular. Using the terminology set forth above, the
state effectively lowered the price at which firms could purchase units
of coverage through patent protection, which logically enables the entry of firms that cannot access alternative appropriation technologies
at a feasible cost and therefore rely primarily on intellectual property
to defend innovation rents. That is precisely what happened.

68

This paragraph consolidates the more extended discussion of the semiconductor industry conducted in Barnett, Property as Process, supra note 60. See also David J.
Teece, Peter Grindley & Edward Sherry, Appendix A: The Semi-Conductor Industry, in
DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 193 (2000) (investigating licensing
and cross-licensing procedures in the electronics industries); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis
& Bronwyn H. Hall, The Effects of Strengthening Patent Rights on Firms Engaged in Cumulative Innovation: Insights from the Semiconductor Industry, in ENTREPRENEURIAL INPUTS AND
OUTCOMES 133 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2001) (examining the effects of the “pro-patent”
shift of the 1980s on the semiconductor industry).
69
In 1984, the industry successfully lobbied for the enactment of sui generis “mask
work” design protections. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 901–914 (2006). However, the statute has had little effect due to certain technological advances that frustrate replication based solely on reverse engineering of the
layout design. See Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years After the Passage of the U.S. Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act: Is International Protection Working?, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049,
1051-52 (2000). Note that this is an example where private appropriation instruments
surpass, and render moot, an upward adjustment in intellectual property protection.
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Roughly as the coverage and strength of available intellectual property
protections increased, the semiconductor market witnessed the rapid
growth of “fabless” and other “design-only” firms that operate under
weakly integrated structures that are largely restricted to developing
patent-protected “chip designs,” which are marketed as intermediate
inputs to strongly integrated entities that develop “systems on a chip”
for incorporation into fully assembled electronic devices. Supported
by the background structure of intellectual property rights, these “design shops” can safely rely on contract to disclose and transfer patented assets and related know-how to other entities that undertake
capital-intensive manufacturing and other functions farther down the
supply chain.
Even if innovative output is largely invariant to the level of intellectual property protections, both firm organization and industry
composition will vary considerably as a function of the strength of
governing intellectual property entitlements: the state-determined
price of maintaining coverage through intellectual property favors the
use of certain transactional and organizational structures used to capture returns from innovation investments, which in turn rewards firms
that can access those structures at the lowest cost and punishes all
others. If so, then intellectual property is primarily a “second-order”
regulatory device for influencing the organizational structures under
which intellectual production takes place rather than a “first-order”
regulatory device for directly inducing innovative output. As a positive proposition, that is a matter of great interest and demands further
70
inquiry to understand its scope of application. But, even if assumed
70

Professors Arora and Merges pioneered this line of inquiry. See Ashish Arora &
Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS.
& CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004) (showing that intellectual property rights can promote
efficiency by influencing the location of technological innovation); Robert P. Merges,
A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477 (2005) (describing
how contract law and property rights are more effective when combined, thereby increasing certainty and flexibility and eliminating some of the limitations of each enforcement method); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial
Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570 (1995) (book review) (noting that
strong forms of intellectual property increase the viability of contract-based arrangements for licensing technical know-how). For additional discussion of this relationship, see the contribution by Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky in this Symposium, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649 (2009).
For relevant empirical studies, see Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection,
Complementary Assets, and Firms’ Incentives for Technology Licensing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 293
(2006), Joanne E. Oxley, Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A
Transaction Cost Approach, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 387 (1997), Joanne E. Oxley, Institutional Environment and the Mechanisms of Governance: The Impact of Intellectual Property Pro-
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to be true over some meaningful range of circumstances, does this
proposition have any relevance as a normative matter?
The differential survival rates of large and small firms—or, more
precisely, integrated and nonintegrated organizational forms—under
different levels of intellectual property protection are simply an industrial phenomenon that implicates no incentive effects, unless there is
evidence to believe that small firms—or, more precisely and generally,
weakly integrated entities—have unique innovation capacities at some
stage of the innovation process in some economically meaningful settings. There is voluminous research on the topic, which, described
conservatively, is less than determinative in the aggregate. A fair
amount of this research, however, supports the view that small firms
are most suited to undertake breakthrough research projects and are
often the catalysts of novel technologies that trigger new innovation
71
There is especially compelling support for the innovative
cycles.
vigor of small firms in the biotechnology market, which, as noted in
part earlier, historically has been driven by the research and development activities of “upstream” firms, which in turn license patentprotected innovations to large, vertically integrated “downstream”
72
pharmaceutical firms. Given the high stakes involved and lucrative
opportunities for third-party expropriation, it is hard to imagine how
these contractual arrangements among otherwise unrelated entities
would be implemented rationally without secure property rights.
These limited findings (which correspond to widespread beliefs in
the business world on the entrepreneurial virtues of start-ups and
73
spin-offs ) may be a function of certain organizational features or a
simple reflection of different competitive pressures: large firms tend
to undertake low-risk, incremental innovation projects that preserve
market share while small firms tend to undertake high-risk, radical in-

tection on the Structure of Inter-Firm Alliances, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 283 (1999), and
Pisano, supra note 57.
71
For some leading sources and reviews of the literature, see P.A. GEROSKI, MARKET DYNAMICS AND ENTRY (1991), and MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ,
MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION (1982). For reviews of the literature for a legal
audience, see Barnett, Genetic Commons, supra note 27, at 1025 n.106, and Barnett, Private Protection, supra note 18, at 1287-89.
72
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
73
See NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, RISK & INNOVATION: THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF
SMALL HIGH-TECH COMPANIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 9 (1995) (noting that small or
rapidly growing high-tech companies receive considerable attention in the media,
business community, and policy circles).
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novation projects that seek to capture market share.
In markets
where this connection between small firms and radical innovation investment has some empirical grounding, the distributive effects of
weaker intellectual property protections—and the collateral effects on
the economic viability of certain transactional structures—may indirectly have incentive effects on the direction of innovation projects that
are pursued in the market. While appropriation capacities in general,
and therefore innovative output in particular, may be roughly constant under stronger and weaker intellectual property regimes,
thereby implying a complete indifference result, the distribution of
innovation projects among incremental and radical projects may be
substantially different, thereby implying a partial indifference result.
In that case, IP matters—not only as a distributive instrument for allocating innovation rents, but, indirectly, as an incentive instrument for
driving innovation investment by entities that are inherently bestsuited to undertake the highest-risk research projects. Even if there is
little to no change in output under a weak or strong intellectual property regime, the average distance of each “inventive step” (or to use
some patent-law vocabulary, the average degree of nonobviousness) is
likely to be smallest under a weak intellectual property regime and
largest under a strong intellectual property regime. If that is the case
(and we do not yet have sufficient information to make a robust determination), then more or less intellectual property certainly does
matter at least some of the time in some markets, even if (or more
precisely, only if ) intellectual property is construed primarily in its traditional function as an incentive instrument.
CONCLUSION
Is intellectual property trivial? For participants in the heated debates over the socially desirable scope of intellectual property reform,
this would appear to be a rhetorical question hardly worthy of consideration. But it is certainly not a rhetorical question in light of the am-
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The standard culprits for large-firm underperformance in R&D are informational asymmetries and agency costs, which lead large-firm managers to favor safe projects over risky projects even if the latter have a higher discounted present value. For
arguments to this effect, see NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, supra note 73, at 37-39, 48-51, and
Bengt Holmström, Agency Costs and Innovation, in THE MARKETS FOR INNOVATION,
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 131 (Richard H. Day et al. eds., 1993). Broader arguments
additionally fault the hierarchical structure of large-firm organizations as stifling radical innovation. E.g., David J. Teece, Firm Organization, Industrial Structure, and Technological Innovation, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 193, 200-01, 212-13 (1996).
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ple empirical evidence suggesting that, in most markets, greater or
lesser levels of intellectual property protection may make little difference in regulating innovative output, coupled with abundant evidence
documenting the wide panoply of alternative instruments by which to
shield innovation returns. Hence, there is a sound basis for the oftsuggested view that a large swath of technological and cultural markets are likely to support robust levels of innovation investment with
or without robust levels of intellectual property protection (provided
that it is additionally observed that firms use other devices to regulate
75
access).
This positive observation would seem to support the normative
position that intellectual property protections in most markets can be
relaxed substantially with little effect on innovative output. The reasoning is simple: if firms can protect intellectual goods without intellectual property, then there would seem to be little, if any, social cost
in substantially curtailing or even abolishing intellectual property altogether. To the contrary, there would necessarily be a social gain if
innovative output were unaffected while the social costs of the intellectual property regime were eliminated. But that reasoning is too
simple: it ignores the (nontrivial) possibility that the social costs of alternative cost-equivalent appropriation instruments, to which firms
will necessarily migrate if intellectual property coverage is reduced,
may exceed the social costs of any lapsed intellectual property instruments. That possibility is commonly ignored in the intellectual property context, where even economically informed commentators regularly advocate substantially limiting or withdrawing intellectual
property protections because markets can and do use other instru76
ments in order to extract sufficient innovation returns.
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This proviso is often dropped. For a fuller description of the extensive implications of this omission and a revised understanding of markets that apparently support
intellectual production without intellectual property, see Barnett, Sharing, supra note 13.
76
See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
(2008), which pursues this argument in detail in a book-length contribution that advocates the complete abolition of intellectual property. For other indicative examples,
see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 10, at 12-14, which provides
examples of musical creation, scientific research, and software development where innovators build freely on previous contributions and then argues that free access, rather
than a market-based ownership system, is the presumptive regime that should govern
informational goods, and Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 36-37 (2004), which questions the need for copyright
given that “many forms of creative expression—such as fashions, new words and slogans, jokes and magic tricks, and the food industry—have flourished in the absence of
protection.”
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This typical argument suffers from the blindness of a static analysis. It assumes that reductions in intellectual property coverage will
inherently expand the public domain of freely accessible knowledge
and thereby lower entry costs into the relevant market, albeit at the
expense of reduced innovation gains. But normative analysis of intellectual property coverage must be dynamic (and complex) if it is to be
realistic: that is, it must anticipate that any downward adjustment in
intellectual property coverage will trigger a variety of possible market
responses that may neutralize or even reverse the adjustment, resulting in (i) no net change in access costs, (ii) a net reduction in access
costs, or (iii) in the most perverse case, even a net increase in access
costs coupled with a reduction in innovation gains. Certainly, further
theoretical work is required to identify more precisely the parameters
under which changes in intellectual property protection are likely to
yield net positive, negative, or neutral incentive/access effects. But
even in the simplest and most benevolent scenario, where the market
simply substitutes substantially cost-equivalent appropriation instruments for state-provided legal entitlements such that innovation incentives and access costs are held constant, there is a plausible case for
a net social loss. This is because the private appropriation technologies that support this invariance result may be available at relatively
lower cost to strongly integrated, large-firm organizations and relatively higher cost to weakly integrated, small-firm organizations.
Hence, even if weaker or stronger levels of intellectual property protection have little effect on access costs and innovation gains, thereby
resulting in substantially equivalent levels of innovative output, any relaxation of intellectual property rights may still result in a distributive
loss insofar as the costs of making recourse to alternative instruments
vary across firm types.
This discussion identifies one of the most salient questions for future policy analysis: do we care about distributive losses that transfer
rents from some firms (usually smaller, weakly integrated entities) to
other firms (usually larger, strongly integrated entities) as a function
of different levels of intellectual property protection? This question
might be rephrased even more simply as follows: do the distributive
effects generated by adjustments in intellectual property coverage
77
raise any efficiency implications? Certainly some rent transfers are
77

I leave open the precise definition of efficiency—whether it be the narrow definition of allocative efficiency, the broader definition of productive efficiency, or the
even broader definition of innovative efficiency—for purposes of assessing the social
costs of distributive losses attendant to rent transfers induced by adjustments in intel-
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socially indifferent. For example, there is no obvious distributive
ground for favoring record labels over hardware manufacturers or
concert promoters in the music business, or vice versa. So the transfer
of rents within the music business as a result of the erosion of copyright is a descriptive observation with no normative implications. But
some rent transfers may raise the prospect of considerable social
losses from an efficiency point of view, which may in turn identify a
determinant policy response. In particular, if weak levels of intellectual property protection drive firms to shield legally unprotected
spillovers by accumulating a broad set of complementary assets and
competencies so as to achieve high levels of vertical and horizontal integration, then it will inherently escalate the minimum cost of entering the market, thereby limiting entry threats, enhancing incumbents’
pricing power, and distorting incumbents’ choices of organizational
forms and transactional designs. And if there is ground to tie integrated forms of business organization and high levels of market concentration with depressed incentives to make certain types of innovation investments, then the distributive losses from weak intellectual
property protection plausibly would yield substantial efficiency losses
even if innovative output in general is largely unaffected.
The ultimate lesson for intellectual property policy can be stated
most precisely as follows: It is difficult to anticipate the effects of adjustments in intellectual property coverage without undertaking a dynamic analysis that anticipates firms’ different capacities to exploit alternative instruments, which may allow some firms to replicate or even
exceed appropriation capacities provided by intellectual property entitlements. This analysis requires information as to three crucial factors: (i) the distribution of costs of coverage across intellectual property and alternative appropriation technologies; (ii) the distribution
of the costs of alternative appropriation technologies across firm
types; and, in some cases, (iii) the distribution of the units of coverage
across alternative appropriation technologies. Simple correlations between more IP and more output and less access, or less IP and less
output and more access, are useful for some analytical purposes in
scholarly discussion and strategic purposes in political rhetoric. But,
for purposes of practically oriented policy analysis, these correlations
are often unsupported by empirical conditions on the ground and are
lectual property coverage. For discussions of these various distinctions, see Joseph F.
Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological
Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032-33 (1987), and F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency,
and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 998-1002 (1987).
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therefore unlikely to provide a reliable framework by which to anticipate the complex and sometimes perverse effects of proposed changes
in intellectual property coverage. Hence, the familiar “antimonopoly”
tendency to favor relaxed intellectual property protections in order to
free the commons can inadvertently advance concentrated market
conditions where entrenched incumbents are protected by natural
barriers to entry by “disruptive” small-firm competitors.
Serious thought should be given to whether the weak patent regime that prevailed in the United States from roughly the 1930s
through the early 1980s supported conglomerate forms of industrial
organization in industries that are often viewed as having suffered
from low entry rates, limited price competition, and conservative tendencies of technological innovation. And serious thought should be
given to whether the relatively strong patent regime that has prevailed
since the early 1980s has supported the development in some of the
most innovative technology sectors (most notably, biotechnology and
semiconductors) of a variety of cooperative structures that exploit the
differential competencies of largely unintegrated firms, including, in
particular, smaller firms that have strong design competencies but
lack manufacturing or distribution capacities. If there is a strong relationship between intellectual property protection and firms’ choices
of organizational forms and transactional structures, and if firms’
choices of industrial organization or transactional structures in turn
govern the direction of firms’ innovation investments in a manner
that is socially relevant, then the social costs of weak intellectual property protection would be great even in the otherwise neutral case
where innovative output is largely insensitive to stronger or weaker
levels of intellectual property protection. So intellectual property
might very well matter, but by a circuitous route that cannot be anticipated by straightforward application of the standard incentives/access
tradeoff.
Inquiry into these tantalizing questions holds the promise of a
powerful intellectual marriage between the incentive framework that
characterizes the intellectual property literature and the economizing
framework that characterizes the transaction-cost-economics literature. If intellectual property plays a meaningful role as an incentive
instrument, our best current understanding suggests that it can only
do so if there is ground to believe that supporting innovation investment within weakly integrated forms of organization yields efficiency
gains by bolstering those entities’ unique competencies at certain
stages in the innovation process. If there is evidence to support this
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view (and, preliminarily, there is support in a number of important
industries), then intellectual property does matter—as an incentive instrument that regulates firms’ innovation behavior indirectly at the
level of organizational and transactional design. If not, then it really is
largely trivial, in which case it reduces to a socially indifferent distributive instrument for slicing up the economic pie created by innovation
investments—a “merely” political question as to which any socially interested normative analysis may have little to add.

